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I. Introduction
Iraqi Tribunal Officials are attempting to establish judicial legitimacy and
maintain legal order, while insurgents are threatening the lives of tribunal judges
and lawyers. Iraqi Judge Barwes Mohammed Mahmoud al-Merwani was killed in
a drive-by-shooting along with his son, lawyer Aryan Barwez al-Merwani on
March 1, 2005.1 Family members of the slain men think they were assisinated by
insurgents because the judge and his lawyer son were both minority Kurds working
for the court.2 This constant threat to tribunal officials raises major obstacles in
continuing to try Iraqi War Criminals in this hostile environment on Iraqi soil.
Tribunal officials put a great deal of thought in assessing where to set up a
tribunal to try Hussein and members of his Baathist regime. In April 2004, the
Iraqi National Congress formed a war crime tribunal made up of Iraqi judges and
Iraqi prosecutors, in order to try Hussein and other members of his Baathist regime
in Iraq. Prior to the establishment of the New Iraq Tribunal, founders visited the
International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands to research the complex
procedural issues of trying high-profile subject like Hussein. The founders
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researched the structure of other international tribunals and met with experts from
tribunals in Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the former Yugoslavia.3
Through advanced study and analysis of other international tribunals, the Iraqi
Court founders evaluated which aspects to employ in their emerging court system.
The Iraqi National Congress wants the new Iraqi Tribunal to be a purely domestic
court, but will combine international regulations with domestic criminal laws and
experiences from international tribunals.4 The goal is that Iraqis will ultimately
run this new court, as they learn how to put a judiciary system together.5
Iraqi Tribunal officials evaluated three international tribunal models to
determine it’s’ formation, procedural development, and legitimacy: (1) the ad hoc
ICTY and ICTR models, (2) the International Criminal Court, and (3) the hybrid
model. By researching the different International Tribunals, the founders of the
Iraqi court evaluated the structure, procedure, location, and enforcement power of
the existing tribunals, and applied the positive methods to the new Iraqi Tribunal.

II. Historical Context
International Criminal law represents a particularly fertile area of institutional
expansion.6 Genocide and war crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction under
the fundamental principles of international common law. According to
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international law, such crimes may be punished by any state because the offenders
are common enemies of all mankind and all national have equal interest in their
apprehension and punishment.7 When crimes against humanity were charged
against a nation state, customary international policy dictated the formation of an
International Military Tribunal or an International Tribunal located in the Locus
Delicti, “place of the wrong.”8 At the present time, however, ad-hoc and hybrid
tribunals are established in a variety of locations. Some are located in the “place
of the wrong,” while others exist in neighboring states or in a centrally devised
international location such as The Hague, Netherlands.
The development of International Courts formed in order to enforce the jus
cogens rules of international morality, those crimes against humanity that are
manifestly illegal under international law.9 By definition jus cogens is Latin for
“compelling law” and is a mandatory norm of general international law which no
two or more nations may exempt themselves or release one another.10 Violations
of human rights such as genocide, slavery and torture are considered jus cogens
rules.
In the aftermath of The Great War (World War I), an era of international
creativity and reformation commenced and the Permanency Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) was established. It was formed by the League of Nations and
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located at the Peace Palace at The Hague, Netherlands.11 “The PCIJ marked a
qualitative change in the settlement of inter-State disputes in that its composition
and its procedures were not under the control of the disputant States.12 The PCIJ
fell simultaneously with the League of Nations at the start of World War II. But, it
revived “another guise” subsequently as part of the United Nations.13
Following World War II, the international community outraged at the atrocities
committed by the Nazi regime, took action by holding the Nuremberg Trials and
tried many leaders who were responsible for egregious violations.14 The
Nuremberg trials established a basic framework and precedent for the prosecution
of war crimes and crimes against humanity and condemned a war of aggression in
the strongest terms. 15 To initiate a war of aggression… is not only an international
crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in
that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.
Nuremberg held individuals accountable for crimes against peace, defined as
the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.16
In addition, another Tribunal was created in the Far East. These two
International Military Tribunals “were made up of rules of procedure tailored to
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that tribunal, and differed markedly from most National procedural systems,
probably being a composite of several systems.”17 Evidence from these military
tribunals was not technically bound; instead any evidence of probative value was
admitted.18 In addition, the jurisdiction was expanded and the courts consisted of
multinational characters but were located in a domestic setting.
As early as 1946, the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly
affirmed the principles of international law recognized by the Charter and
Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal (The Nuremberg principles). In 1948, it
adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, which “defined genocide and proclaimed it a crime against international
law.19 “In this wave of remorse and idealism, the United Nations and its charter
are now considered the foundation for international human rights law.”20 It was in
the resolution adopting that Convention that the United Nations General Assembly
first considered the establishment of an international criminal court.21
The Geneva Conventions of 1949, not only codified and expanded the rules of
war, but also included basic protections for civilians.22 The Conventions contained
common articles regarding grave breaches, which in effect constitute war crimes or
17
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crimes against humanity. Under these articles, states are obligated to search for
persons who commit grave breaches and bring them to trial regardless of their
sovereign links.23
As a result of the Geneva Conventions and the movement for resolution of
international conflicts, the United States adopted the concept of Universal
Jurisdiction. Under customary international law principles, a state has jurisdiction
to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the
community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks
on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of
terrorism.24 Universal jurisdiction over the specified offenses is a result of
universal condemnation of those activities and general interest in cooperating to
suppress them, as reflected in widely accepted international agreements and
resolutions of international organizations.25
The suffering and atrocities that took place in the course of the conflicts of the
1990s stimulated a series of far-reaching responses by the international
community, including collective humanitarian interventions and the subsequent
creation of the temporary entitles International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda
(ICTR) and the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by the United Nations Security Council
and NATO respectively.26 This intervention by the International Community

23

See Yvonne C. Lodico, The Justifications for Humanitarian Intervention: Will the Continent Matter?, 35 Int’l
Law. n.1027, 1037 (2001). See also, Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules n.164 (1999).
24
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987).
25
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987).
26
Compare Michael J. Matheson, 97 A.J.I.L. n.466 (2003), and LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL
ARMED CONFLICT n.253 (2003) (explaining that Moir’s book analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the

6

began an ascendance that went beyond territorial borders and sovereign abuses
therein,27 and international courts made up of international and domestic judges, to
lay a foundation for grave abuses of human rights violations. In this regard,
international organizations and states have gained more responsibility toward
protecting lives and toward delivering humanitarian assistance, even through
military means.28
The formation of these new ad-hoc tribunals was costly and time consuming.
United Nations officials began to realize that tribunals established after the fact are
typically bound by mandates that are specific in time and place.29 The need for a
permanent International Court was forthcoming, as temporary tribunals like the
ICTY and ICTR were challenging, lengthy and expensive undertakings. The
United Nations began to look into the possibility of forming a treaty-based
permanent international court.
Therefore in July 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague,
Netherlands was established, through a treaty of nations. The ICC aims through a
mandate to bring to justice individuals responsible for the world’s most serious
crimes, atrocities and mass murders in an efficient and effective manner.30 The
ICC has jurisdiction over member states, without a special mandate from the
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United Nations Security Council.31 The intent of this international judiciary is to
deter war criminals, and is established as an independent entity.32
Although the ICC has no cases in its books, the new investigatory power of
this global court is beginning to raise awareness and gain recognition in order to
“tackle the world’s gravest of crimes.”33 In December 2003, the President of
Uganda referred the tumultuous situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army
to the ICC Prosecutor. The first investigation of the International Criminal Court
is now underway in an attempt to uncover violations of international law and
custom in Uganda.34 This particular method of discovery could assist nations who
do not have internal intelligence agencies at their disposal, in order to uncover
evidence regarding crimes on humanity. Most recently, in April 2004, the
President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo asked for the
ICC to investigate possible war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity
stemming from their civil war, which killed around three million people.35
In addition, nations with struggling or non-existent judiciary systems have
reached out to the United Nations, after witnessing the formation of the Ad-Hoc
tribunals of the ICTY and the ICTR. As a result, need-based hybrid tribunals were
recently set up by the United Nations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and
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Cambodia. These institutions blend international and domestic laws, and are set up
with the help of the United Nations, to provide a justice where a Baathist run court
system existed. After the Baathist party came to power in 1968, the judiciary
ended separation of powers, and civilian courts became subservient to military
courts.36 The court system was then comprised of military courts, religious courts,
revolutionary courts and special courts. In revolutionary courts, no appellate level
existed.37
The goal to form a new Iraqi Court was announced in April 2004, to try the
Baathist regime leaders and former Iraqi leader Sadaam Hussein. The Iraqi Court
is comprised of a panel of seven Iraqi judges and four Iraqi prosecutors. There
have been serious doubts that the special tribunal will meet international standards,
primarily because the judges are not familiar with international law.38 The United
States has sent a small group to assist Iraqi investigators and judges, however they
are not going to be running the process.39 The international tribunal models of the
ICC, ICTY, ICTR, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and the former Yugoslavia; will
surely influence the direction of the new Iraqi Tribunal. Yet continued violence
against the new tribunal may not only inhibit the legal function and effectiveness
of the Court, but will surely deter some judges and lawyers from wanting to
participate in the legal process when their lives are at stake.
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III. Legal Analysis

A. Ad Hoc Tribunals
a. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia celebrated its
tenth anniversary last year.40 In the past decade, the ICTY ad hoc tribunal has
created more legal precedent than all the previous international and domestic war
crimes cases combined.41 But, there is also sharp criticism regarding efficiency,
legitimacy, and local.
The framework of the court system in the former Yugoslavia is vast and
there are several legal institutions adjudicating the atrocities stemming from crimes
against humanity. The International Court of Justice, national courts, and a hybrid
tribunal also help to play a part of this seemingly, “institutional constellation in the
former Yugoslavia.”42 The ICJ deals with reparative claims involving state
responsibility while national courts are involved in civil and criminal litigation.43
Additionally, a hybrid overflow tribunal was created to handle the backlog of cases
from the ICTY, and is located in Kosovo. Since such a “diverse array of
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institutions” are involved, a number of jurisdictional co-existence rules have
developed as a result.44
“Several rules have been developed regarding the relationship of the ICTY
with local and national institutions when it comes to the adjudication of individual
criminal responsibility for mass atrocity in the former Yugoslavia.”45 International
tribunals have jurisdictional primacy over national or local courts in criminal
adjudication of mass atrocities.46 ICTY now has primacy of over national courts,
but no person may be tried before a national court, if that person already has been
tried by the ICTY. Rules of evidence are also affected by the multi-layered
national and international court infrastructure. Under the ICTY Rules of Procedure
and Evidence Rule 12, any state determination is not binding upon the ICTY. “As
such, the ICTY is not compelled to follow national decisions regarding important
legal findings (for example the existence of genocide in Bosnia and
Herzegovina).”47
When criminals of the former territory of Yugoslavia were tried for crimes
against humanity in an International Tribunal, numerous jurisdictional objections
arose as to whether the tribunal had subject-matter jurisdiction over offenses,
which constituted International Conflict.48 Yugoslavia was charged with the
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violation of international humanitarian law, and former leaders of the territory
were prosecuted for grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. An
indictment was issued against the commander of the Bosnian Croat forces in
response to the following violated conventions:
(a) Willful killing; (d) extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly; violations of the laws and customs of
war, as recognized by article 3.49
In addition, the International Court of Justice also tried the former Yugoslavia for
violations against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.50
Bosnia and Herzegovina wanted to hold Yugoslavia accountable for breach
of its obligations under general and customary international law, as well as
obligations under the United Nations Charter.51 The basis for the International
Court’s jurisdiction is grounded in the Customary and Conventional International
Laws of War and International Humanitarian Law, but was also formed according
to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Charter, The Hague Regulations
on Land Warfare of 1907, and the Nuremberg Charter, Judgment, and Principles.52
The ICTY was established at The Hague, far removed from the scene of the
atrocities, and the court is comprised of International judges and staff.53 With that
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said, the lack of perceived legitimacy and connection to the local population is a
root of many problems centered in the ICTY:
“A recent empirical study of the perceptions of the ICTY within Bosnia and
Herzegovina indicates that a wide cross-section of lawyers and judges from
all ethnic groups, while playing a different roles within Bosnian society,
were similarly ill-informed about the ICTY’s work, and were often
suspicious of its motives and its results.”54
The ICTY is centered in The Hague but also does work in Bosnia. However, the
failure of the ICTY to publicize its Bosnia connection and the lack of local
participation attributes to a lack of perceived legitimacy.55 Critics maintain that a
“purely international process that bypasses the local population does little to help
improve the capacity of the local population to establish its own justice system.”56
“An international court staffed by foreigners, or even a local justice system
operated exclusively by the UN transitional administration, cannot hope to train
local actors in necessary skills.”57
Despite all the criticisms regarding jurisdictional scope and legitimacy, the
ICTY has set forth precedent in International law. On April 19, 2004, the ICTY
ruled on an extended definition of “genocide.58” The term genocide as set forth by
the ICTY encompasses:
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“Those who devise and implement genocide seek to deprive humanity of the
manifold richness its nationalities, races, ethnicities and religions provide.
This is a crime against all humankind, its harm being felt not only by the
group targeted for destruction, but by all humanity.”
The ICTY Appeals chamber unanimously found that “genocide was committed in
Srebrenica in 1995.”59 This recent ruling will send rippling effects to other
international tribunals and domestic tribunals who follow international law, and set
the stage for trials concerning genocide and crimes against humanity in the future.

b. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
The United Nations Security Council Chapter VII Resolution established a
temporary entity, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994, after
recognizing that serious violations of humanitarian law were committed.60
Rwandan President Paul Kagame, painted a cryptic picture of crimes against
humanity, describing the genocide of almost 1 million people in 1994 as, “the most
brutal and fastest massive killing in world history.”61 President Kagame says
Rwanda seeks reparations and, “to forgive, but not forget; to bury the dead, but not
spirits; and to bring forth justice and reconciliation.”62
Since it’s inception, the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
delivered the first ever judgment on the crime of genocide by an international
court. The ICTR has encountered obstacles much like it’s counterpart the ICTY.
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However, The ICTR faces even greater problems due to the lack local support,
inefficiency, inequity, leniency and distant location hindrances.
The Rwandan government itself is critical of the ICTR, as they have a seat
on the UN Security Council and originally voted against the formation of the
tribunal.63 The ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda is located in the neighboring country of
Tanzania, and the seat of the council is set up in Arusha. This creates difficulties
in obtaining evidence, as travel is difficult for witnesses and guarantees “further
intractable delays.”64
The ICTR proceedings, which adhere to the “Western Rules of the Law,” are
criticized as slow, expensive and unduly selective.65 The subject matter of the
ICTR is broad, and encompasses violations of international humanitarian law,
which are also part of customary international law.66 An American Judge, David
M. Ebel, helped set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is
discouraged by it’s performance:
“It is a bloated an inefficient Tribunal that has squandered staggering
amounts of money and valuable time. Had the budget of the ICTR been
allocated to the Country of Rwanda, they could have tried the 120,000
prisoners that have been held in Rwandan prisons for more than 10 years.
Instead, the ICTR has manages only a handful of trials to date.”67
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The structure of the ICTR consists of three organs; the Chambers and Appeals
Chamber; the Office of the Prosecutor, in charge of investigations and
prosecutions; and the Registry, responsible for providing overall judicial and
administrative support to the Chambers and the Prosecutor.68
The ICTR is composed exclusively of international judges elected by the
United Nations General Assembly, and a Prosecutor selected by the Security
Council.69 The judges are elected by the United Nations General Assembly, and
are submitted by the Security Council.70 They are initially selected from a list
submitted by Member States of the United Nations. The judges are elected for a
four-year term, and no two judges may be nationals of the same state.71
The International mixture of judges can further complicate the structure if
the ICTR, “because each of the judges is of a different nationality and comes from
different traditions.72” In addition, an internationally equitable pay scale can create
an incentive for some to work slowly and collect high pay:
“The U.N. has a pay scale that tries to compensate everyone equally
according to the private pay scale of the highest employee. Because some of
the judges are from the United States or Europe, where pay is high, that
means that extraordinarily high pay is also given to the judges from the
underdeveloped countries. The pay scale for those from underdeveloped
regions is so unrealistic compared to local economic conditions that the local
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prosecutors, defenders and judges have every incentive to turn this
appointment into a life-time job.”73
Therefore, the differences in language, custom and pay lead to an inequity among
judges and perpetrate an unduly slow process at the ICTR.
Furthermore, the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda is criticized as
being less strict on those convicted than are the customary Rwandan domestic
courts. There is a lot of tension between the government of Rwanda and the ICTR,
because Rwanda believes that the ICTR has intermingled in its affairs by grabbing
prominent and culpable criminals and “providing them with an easier forum where
they are guaranteed not to get the death penalty.”74 The ICTR has custody over
those who masterminded the genocide of the Rwandan people, and may not issue a
death sentence.75 As a result, many Rwandan citizens feel that the court
emphasizes the rights of the accused, and does not give enough respect to the rights
of the victims.76 In contrast, domestic Rwandan courts can issue death sentences to
less notorious criminals, and have issued death sentences to 20 percent of their
criminals.77
The ICTR faces staunch criticism as being inefficient and slow, and has
faced tension from the government of Rwanda regarding jurisdictional matters and
73
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the inability to apply the death penalty. But, despite such tension and discord the
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda has raised awareness of the human
rights violations, created a permanent record, and convicted numerous individuals
for crimes of genocide:78
“The ICTR had also given critical international legitimacy to the trial
of some of the leading perpetrators of the genocide. It has established
two very important legal precedents: first, that rape can be an
instrument of genocide. Secondly, that private citizens who do not
directly participate in the genocide and who have no official
responsibilities for the genocide, can nevertheless be held accountable
for the genocide if the encourage and otherwise indirectly aid and abet
the genocide. These legal principles, by themselves are probably
worth the enormous budget of the ICTR. It has provided a forum for
international jurisdiction to obtain perpetrators who have fled across
the globe. Some of the apprehending countries probably would not
have extradited their prisoners back to Rwanda although they were
willing to extradite to the ICTR.”79
Therefore, the Rwanda Tribunal laid down important international legal
precedents, amidst all the difficulties of structure and procedure.
The ICTR is somewhat of a “mixed bag” as it has laid a foundation for
justice in Rwanda, though encountering serious delays and structural problems.80
As a result of those expensive and lengthy proceedings of the ad hoc tribunals of
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and in an effort to reform the international
court system, the United Nations took steps towards forming a treaty to develop a
permanent International Criminal Court.
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B. International Criminal Court
In July 1998 in Rome, Italy, 120 member states of the United Nations
formed a treaty and established the International Criminal Court.81 The permanent
international court had jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and the crime of aggression.82 Four years later, sixty nation states became
parties to the Rome Statute through ratification or accession.83 These parties have
consented to jurisdiction at the ICC. The Rome Charter of the ICC is the first ever
treaty based, international criminal court established to promote the role of
international law and to ensure the gravest crimes do not go unpunished.84
The ICC (much like the ICTY and ICTR) has also encountered opposition
due to sovereign notions, lack of enforcement, centralized location efficiency, and
its euro-centric death penalty stance.
In an effort to preserve internal sovereignty, the United States did not sign
the Rome Charter. The United States voted against the Rome Statute, concluding
that it could pose an unacceptable risk to the U.S. military personnel and to the
ability of commander in chief to deploy forces worldwide to protect the United
States and global interests.85 The United States looked at globalization as a
transformation of the world economy, and also an alteration of the competence of
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sovereignty and of the principle of the nation state being the principal center of
power.86 “Some now argue that, on balance, any such court (ICC) would disserve
American interests. Others contend that with the (ICC) court becoming a reality,
the costs of not joining far outweigh the costs of joining.”87 In any event, by
voting against the Rome Statute, the United States refused to accept jurisdiction
under the International Criminal Court.
The courts jurisdiction is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community. It has jurisdiction of member states with respect to the
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.88 The ICC intends to
be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions, but does not aim to
replace national courts. The court will only investigate and prosecute matters
when a state is unable or disinclined to do their legal duties.89
In addition to statutory international law, the ICC also takes violations of
customary international law into account. The list of customs applicable in
international armed conflicts enumerates the following criminal acts:
o Targeting civilians
o Targeting buildings devoted to art or science;
o Killing combatants who have laid down their arms and
surrendered
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o Declaring that no quarter will be given
o Pillaging
o Using a flag or truce or other flag or insignia falsely, resulting
in death or serious injury
o Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other forms of sexual
violence
o Intentional starvation of civilians as a method of warfare
Proposals have been made to include poisoned weapons, gas weapons,
chemical weapons, bacteriological weapons, and nuclear weapons.90 Until these
weapons proposals are instilled in ICC law, it might be difficult to show a violation
of customary international law regarding weapons of mass destruction or chemical
weapons by Sadaam Hussein or leaders of the former Iraqi government.
Evidence of violations of Geneva Accords, the Rome Statute of the ICC,
crimes against United Nations Personnel, international treaties, or customary
international law can be initiated through an investigation authorized by a Pre-Trial
Chamber as a means of “international discovery.”91 This international method of
obtaining evidence of crimes against humanity is paving the way for international
procedural discovery.
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There is much criticism concerning the ICC’s ability to enforce International
judgments. A considerable body of international law exists to protect civilians
during internal armed conflict.92 The main problem lies not in the content of those
rules, but rather in their enforcement.93 In the past in cohesive resolutions made by
the United Nations Security Council, the ICC, and national governments in the
international arena have carried little weight, since they are unable to be enforced
and carried out. Measures which might facilitate enforcement are: criminal
prosecution of violators by national courts and international tribunals; belligerent
reprisals; dissemination of humanitarian law; measures by other governments
(including the use of force); measures by the International Red Cross, the United
Nations and other international entities; and action by regional human right bodies.
The signs are hopeful that the international community is beginning to face up to
its responsibilities as regards to the enforcement of international law – largely on
the basis of the creation of the ICTR, ICTY, and the ICC.94
The ICC is under scrutiny by those favoring a hybrid model as being too
remote. The ICC holds trials in The Hague, Netherlands rather than in the location
where the crimes occurred:
“Because the work of the international courts is physically remote from the
countries in question, and the judges and personnel have not been drawn
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from the local population, there is little opportunity for domestic legal
professionals to absorb, apply, interpret, critique, and develop international
norms. The mere existence of an international court does not create a
channel for its jurisprudence to be used and developed, or even merely
respected and understood on a local level.”95
The remote location of the ICC can hinder witnesses, delay proceedings, and create
unduly expensive trials.
In addition, the International Criminal Courts cannot sentence violators of
gross international crimes to death. Widely disapproved in international custom,
the death penalty is also restricted in Article 4 of the American Convention of
Human Rights recognizes the right to life and restricts the application of the death
penalty. One exception is the reservation is set forth in Article 2 allows the death
penalty for extremely serious wartime crimes of a military nature. 96 Unless war
crimes of a grievous nature take place, then the international community will not
advocate the death penalty. Some nations, who apply the death penalty, may not
want to submit their membership to the ICC, because of perceived leniency.
The ICC is a separate entity from the United Nations, and is funded by from
states contributions, voluntary contributions from governments, international
organizations, individuals, and corporations.97 The International Criminal Court
has developed a permanent court structure to “handle the world’s most serious
crimes, atrocities and mass murders.”98 For years to come, the ICC will build upon
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its successes and failures to improve the international forum for crimes of universal
proportion.

B. Hybrid Model – UN Helping Domestic Arena
The Hybrid Model is an intermediary between the ad-hoc tribunals (ICTY,
ICTR, ICC) and a purely domestic tribunal. Hybrid models can change
“considerably depending on the unique circumstances of each case.”99 The
proponents of the hybrid model feel that, “there are no cookie-cutter solutions to
the highly complex issues of confronting past atrocities.”100
A hybrid model was set up in Kosovo by the United Nations, in order to
relieve a backlog of human rights cases from the International Courts for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) International Tribunal. In East Timor and Sierra
Leone, the hybrid model was employed where no politically viable full-fledged
international tribunal previously existed. Additionally, a hybrid model is currently
under negotiation in Cambodia.101 In order to carry out their mission, the hybrid
courts need to rely on international cooperation and judicial assistance by states
and international organizations.102
Hybrid Courts have attracted little attention, while standing in the shadows
of the ICC. The hybrid model is criticized as only providing a temporary solution
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for adjudication, and since the hybrid model is not a permanent international court,
critics content:
“That hybrid courts like those of East Timor and Sierra Leone arose only
because of “tribunal fatigue” and that the existence of an international
tribunal with applicable jurisdiction would have made the hybrid tribunals
unnecessary.”103
Another criticism arises regarding the ultimate goal of judicial independence in
countries, which would rather instill a permanent judicial system, and are looking
towards future stability, not just temporary solutions.
Conversely, the hybrid model is also considered a newly emerging form of
accountability and reconciliation, is a blend of the ICC and a domestic military
tribunal.104
Proponents feel the hybrid court maintains a balance, as both the
institutional apparatus and the applicable law consist of a blend of the international
and the domestic and is set up by the United Nations.105 The hybrid model is
generally utilized in post-conflict settings and is mixture of domestic and
international structure and procedure. Hybrid courts are made up of domestic and
foreign judges, and tried by local prosecution and defense teams. Domestic law is

103

See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295,
307 (2003).
104
See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295
(2003).
105
See Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, n.295
(2003).

25

reformed to accord with international standards, and the courts are conceived in an
ad hoc way.106
This blend strikes up controversy from those critical to the ICC, such as the
Bush Administration. The hybrid model may be seen as too close to the formal
international courts, and too far from the domestic war crimes tribunal. The hybrid
model is seemingly a balancing-act between domestic and international infusion,
and the goal is to attain a balance in a locale where not other feasible judiciary
exists.
a. Kosovo (overflow)
The United Nations established a hybrid court in Kosovo to deal with a
backlog of the many egregious human rights cases overflowing from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The ICTY
only had enough resources to try only those who had committed the worst
atrocities on the widest scale, and needed to pass off some of the human rights
violations and war crimes cases to the hybrid court.107 The legal infrastructure of
Kosovo was virtually non-existent, as the law libraries and courts were ravaged
during the years of conflict between the Serbians and Albanians.108 There were
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shortages of local lawyers and judges as Albanians were barred from judiciary for
many years, and the Serbian judges and lawyers fled or refused to serve.109
To deal with the sparse legal resources, a mixture of international and
domestic lawyers and judges serve the hybrid courts.110 The war-crimes trials were
held in courts with a majority of international judges and prosecutors.111 Judges
applied substantive law that was also a blend of international and domestic.
In addition, local law was only applied when it followed the “international human
rights norms.”112

b. East Timor
The United Nations responded to a security crisis in East Timor by sending
in an Australian peacekeeping force to restore order in September 1999.113 The
United Nations later established a hybrid court in East Timor, where the local legal
infrastructure was in even greater disarray than in Kosovo. As a result of the
militia rampage and violence, shelter and supplies were difficult to obtain.114
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There were few trained lawyers, and the “militia members suspected of committing
mass atrocities were being held in makeshift prison facilities.”115
Serious crimes such as, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
murder, and sexual offenses were held before panels of three judges. The panel
was made up of one East-Timorese judge and two International judges.116 This
was a historic concept because, “never before have East-Timorese judges sat in
judgment of their fellow people, and never before have East Timorese prosecutors
and defense lawyers appears as professionals in their own land.”117 Now that EastTimor has gained independence from Indonesia, the hybrid system will continue to
play a significant role in finding accountability for human rights abuses. However,
this hybrid court is having problems because of the lack of funding and personnel
at the present time.118

c. Sierra Leone
Soon after a peace agreement in Sierra Leone was reached in July 1999,
rebels resumed attacks in Sierra Leone.119 The resurgence of attacks prompted the
government of this West African country to ask the United Nations to establish an
international court to prosecute those responsible for war crimes during their civil
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war.120 The Security Council asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
Kofi Annan, to make a blueprint for an independent special court whose subject
matter included “crimes against humanity, war crimes and other violations of
international humanitarian law.”121 This special court is set up at the headquarters
of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The
special court of Sierra Leone is loosely based on the ICTY/ ICTR models, but was
designed to differ from the Rwandan and Bosnian models in several ways.
The hybrid court of Sierra Leone is a treaty based-court, and differs from the
ICTR/Y in primacy, composition, subject matter jurisdiction, location, and
efficiency.122 The Special Court will also have the full backing of the Sierra Leone
government,123 which will ultimately facilitate its success. The local support will
be integral to the efficiency of the Sierra Leone court, as evidenced by the constant
obstacles posed on the ICTR arising from the criticism by the Rwandan
government and people.
The first difference is the hybrid model can issue binding orders to the
government of Sierra Leone, but unlike the ICTR/ ICTY, it will be unable to assert
primacy over national courts of third states to order surrender of an accused.124
Secondly, this hybrid model is composed of both Sierra Leonean judges and
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international judges. The Government of Sierra Leone will appoint two judges,
and the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan will appoint one judge.125 Thirdly, the
subject matter of the special court will extend to encompass not only violations of
international humanitarian law, but also certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law.
The Special court will not have subject matter jurisdiction over the crime of
genocide, unlike the ICTR/ ICTY.126 There was no evidence that the mass killing
in Sierra Leone was against an identifiable national, ethnic, racial group with the
intent to annihilate that group.127 Since the government of Sierra Leone asked for
help from the U.N. if forming the special court, their compliance will surely help
the process to move more quickly than the ICTY/R which each took more than two
years to become fully operational.128
The hybrid model of Sierra Leone, infuses the local customs and laws of the
domestic state with international law. This special court was loosely based in the
ICTR/Y, yet also took into account special circumstances behind its treaty-based
inception, which gives it less U.N. power and backing than the ICTR/Y. Hybrid
courts such as the Sierra Leone model can strike a balance between domestic and
international, and this court may be a model for other U.N. treaty-based courts in
the future.
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d. Cambodia
A fourth hybrid tribunal is currently under negotiation between the United
Nations and Cambodia. The Cambodia court will be named the “Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.” The U.N. has expressed grave concern
regarding the numerous violations of human rights in Cambodia, which include:
extra judicial executions, torture, rape, and lack of due process.129 There is special
concern regarding the current judicial system of Cambodia and the reluctance and
inability to charge members of the government and militia with violations of
human rights.130

IV. Appraisal
As International Criminal Tribunals have evolved and blended international
and domestic structures, more choices exist for countries looking to expand and
reform their judiciary systems. This era of international and domestic legal
integration comes as a result of the increases in communication, diplomacy,
democracy, and an inter-connected global economy.
Iraqi Tribunal Founders evaluated the Ad-hoc models of the ICTY and
ICTR, the ICC, and the hybrid models when forming their new judiciary. By
doing this preliminary research and appraisal, officials learned from historic
lessons in this area in order to build-upon the setbacks and problems of the already
existent tribunal models. Learning from the previous successes and failures of
129
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already established International Criminal Tribunals will potentially solidify a
stable foundation for the Iraq Court.

V. Recommendation
The founders of the new Iraqi Tribunal should weigh the attributes of each
International Criminal Court model, and apply the rationale to their specific
situation, much like the rationale behind the hybrid model. In addition, tribunal
officials should remain flexible as the volatility of the region lends itself to
potential problems for this new judicial body. Iraq should look to maintain a
legitimate court, employ new laws, utilize international law as well as customary
international law, and maintain a connection with the international legal
community.
Maintaining legitimacy will be important to the success of the New Iraqi
Tribunal. Hussein is a high-profile figure like Milosovic, and therefore the Iraqi
founders can learn a great deal from the successes and failures of the ICTY. The
ICTY has set forth precedent, but the perceived legitimacy by the local people has
been it’s greatest problem. Since, the newly formed Iraqi Tribunal is being set up
through a seemingly nepotistic connection (familial connection between head of
congress and a former head of judiciary Salaam Chalabi), this has already posed a
great threat to perceived legitimacy of the court as a puppet to United States
interests. In addition the legitimacy of the tribunal has also been questioned
because its creator, Paul Bremer as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority,
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selected the tribunals personnel and provided for it’s funding.131 This it is
construed by some as a “victors’ tribunal.”132
The domestic location of the Iraq Court will be beneficial to maintaining
economic efficiency, and to the establishment of a reformed court system. The
Iraqi founders have established the new court inside the borders of Iraq, and thus
should not experience problems like the ICTY and ICTR regarding the great
expenditures related to obtaining evidence and witnesses. The Iraqi people will
have to draft a new constitution, and update Iraqi’s criminal and commercial codes
to ensure consistency with the needs of a modern democratic society and market
economy.133
Since the Iraq court is set up in a post conflict setting, this mirrors a hybrid
model in regards to location in the “place of the wrong.” Since the tribunal will be
comprised of Iraqi judges, this should help speed up the trial process, unlike the
multi-national efficiency problems of the ICTR and ICTY. Because the officials of
the new court are all from Iraq there may be a balanced pay scale, which will also
create a higher level of procedural efficiency. However, the current hostility of
insurgents is plaguing the Iraqi Tribunal and is a constant threat to all officials.
Pentagon intelligence data shows an escalating insurgency, as each monthly peak
in the number of violent incidents is followed by a higher average number of
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violent attacks in subsequent months.134 The court should remain flexible and may
need to move locations if the region increasingly becomes unstable to house a
judiciary.
In addition, the blending of local and international laws might cause
complex problems to occur. Human rights groups are warning that the court is
already flawed, and Human Rights Watch points to the lack of protection of
witnesses ad the failure to involve non-Iraqi prosecutors and investigative
judges.135 Problems may arise if the local laws are not balanced properly with
international laws:
“Where justice is purely local, on the other hand, the problem takes a
slightly different form. Local courts and local lawyers, unfamiliar with
international standards, may seek to apply ordinary criminal law to the mass
atrocities in question, even if the local law technically incorporates
international humanitarian law.”136
The backing of the international community is necessary if crimes against
humanity and war crimes are to be enforced in an international forum. Since the
international community could possibly take a back seat in the proceedings, as
there are no international judges or prosecutors, problems may arise regarding
international backing and enforcement of the new Iraqi Tribunal issued judgments.
“In August 2003, a team of U.N. specialists concluded that Iraq had a
degraded system that is not capable of rendering a fair and effective justice
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for violations of international humanitarian law and other serious criminal
offenses involving the prior regime.” 137
It is unapparent who will provide funding for the new Iraqi Court, and if the United
Nations will back this court at all.
Under Iraqi law, there is a statute specifying that Sadaam Hussein’s lead
attorney needs to be an Iraqi.138 To defend him, Husseins’ family has selected 20
lawyers out of nearly 600 who offered their services.139
The International Criminal Court was not a particularly feasible forum to try
members of the former Iraqi regime. In order to try Hussein at the ICC, either Iraq
or the United States would need to be a member party to the Rome Treaty. In
addition, the ICC cannot issue a death sentence, and to the United States and Iraq
this may be considered an unattractive and lenient punishment.
In conclusion, the Iraqi Tribunal faces a long road towards legitimacy,
permanency and complete formation. This tribunal currently employs a domestic
base, with some hybrid and ad-hoc additives. The Iraq Tribunal wants to maintain
purely domestic and become a permanent fixture in the new Iraq, however this will
be an increasingly difficult task to obtain until the region is stable. Ultimately, the
court will need to maintain international ties, to reform laws, and learn from the
successes and failures of the prior international tribunal models.
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